Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions by Efraim Benmelech et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
COUNTER-SUICIDE-TERRORISM:










We are grateful to Eli Berman, Javier Gardeazabal, Laura Jones Dooley, David Laibson, Ariel Merari,
Eva Milgrom, Paul Milgrom, Daniele Paserman, and Todd Sandler for very helpful suggestions. We
have also benefited from comments from participants in the Workshop on Political Economy of Counter
Insurgency at Princeton University, the Workshop on Political Economy of Terrorism and Insurgency
at University of California, San Diego, the Workshop on Terrorism Policy at University of Texas,
Dallas, the National Bureau of Economic Reseach summer Workshop on the Economics of National
Security, the Western Economic Association meetings, and seminars at Harvard University. We thank
the Israeli Security Agency for data on suicide terrorists and B’Tselem (The Israeli Information Center
for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) for data on house demolitions. Esteban Klor is grateful
for the warm hospitality of Boston University and the National Bureau of Economic Research while
working on this project. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi, and Esteban Klor. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions
Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi, and Esteban Klor




This paper examines whether house demolitions are an effective counterterrorism tactic against suicide
terrorism. We link original longitudinal micro-level data on houses demolished by the Israeli Defense
Forces with data on the universe of suicide attacks against Israeli targets. By exploiting spatial and
time variation in house demolitions and suicide terror attacks during the second Palestinian uprising,
we show that punitive house demolitions (those targeting Palestinian suicide terrorists and terror operatives)
cause an immediate, significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks. The effect dissipates over
time and by geographic distance. In contrast, we observe that precautionary house demolitions (demolitions
justified by the location of the house but not related to the identity or any action of the house’s owner)
cause a significant increase in the number of suicide terror attacks. The results are consistent with
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1. Introduction 
Although it is commonly argued that government policies to deter terrorism and disrupt the 
operations  of  terror  organizations  tend  to  be  effective  (Ganor,  2005),  alternative  theoretical 
models suggest that they may have a boomerang effect. According to this view, harsh measures 
of counterterrorism backfire by fostering hatred and attempts to exact revenge (Siqueira and 
Sandler,  2006).  In  particular,  while  counterterrorism  policies  typically  affect  the  general 
population, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies depends on their ability to target terror 
organizations directly.
1 
However, despite the wide interest that counterterrorism policies draw and the abundance 
of  related  theoretical  studies,  there  is  little  empirical  evidence  on  the  effectiveness  of 
counterterrorism  measures.  Assessing  the  effectiveness  of  counterterrorism  policies  requires 
detailed micro-level data on terror attacks and counterterrorism operations. Unfortunately, such 
detailed data are typically not publicly available. 
This paper attempts to fill this gap by linking novel micro-level data on house demolitions 
(a policy used by the Israeli Defense Forces [IDF] to combat and deter terrorism) and suicide 
attacks, empirically documenting the effects of house demolitions on future suicide attacks. We 
differentiate  between  the  two  main  types  of  house  demolitions  carried  out  by  the  IDF: 
precautionary  demolitions  and  punitive  house  demolitions.  Precautionary  demolitions  are 
intended  to  prevent  the  launching  of  attacks  from  specific  locations  and  are  not  related  to 
activities carried out by the owners or occupants of the houses being demolished. In contrast, in 
punitive house demolitions, the IDF demolishes or seals houses that were home to Palestinian 
suicide terrorists or to individuals suspected, detained, or convicted of involvement in violent 
acts against Israelis. 
Our analysis is based on original micro-level data. We use a longitudinal micro-level data 
set  containing  information  on  all  punitive  house  demolitions  during  the  second  Palestinian 
uprising as well as all precautionary house demolitions between 2004 and 2005. For each house 
demolished we know the exact location of the house, the timing of the demolition, the house’s 
size, and the number of its residents. We link this data set with data on the universe of suicide 
terrorists during the same time period, including each terrorist’s timing of the attack and locality 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) and Fearon and Laitin (2003).   2 
of residence. We augment our data with localities’ specific economic and demographic data, as 
well as with longitudinal variation of other counterterrorism measures imposed by the IDF. This 
detailed  data  set  allows  us  to  use  time  and  spatial  variation  to  identify  and  quantify  the 
effectiveness of house demolitions as a deterrence policy of counterterrorism. 
We  find  that  punitive  house  demolitions  lead  to  fewer  suicide  attacks  in  the  month 
following the demolitions. The effect of house demolition is significant and sizeable—a standard 
deviation  increase  in  punitive  house  demolitions  leads  to  a  decrease  of  11.7  percent  in  the 
number of suicide terrorists originating from an average district. Intriguingly, we find that in 
contrast to the deterrent effect of punitive house demolitions, precautionary demolitions (which 
are  not  related  to  activities  of  the  houses’  owners  and  occupants)  are  associated  with  more 
suicide  attacks.  In  particular,  our  estimates  show  that  a  standard  deviation  increase  in 
precautionary  house  demolitions  leads  to  a  48.7  percent  increase  in  the  number  of  suicide 
terrorists from an average district. 
Our results are robust to alternative measures of house demolitions, such as the number of 
housing units demolished, number of residents affected, and the area size of demolished houses. 
The results are also robust to different specifications including a battery of control variables, 
counterterrorism  measures,  and  fixed  effects.  Moreover,  we  examine  the  robustness  of  our 
results under alternative counterfactuals, estimate the persistence of the effects, and test whether 
these effects change directions over time. 
The results indicate that, when targeted correctly, counterterrorism measures such as house 
demolitions provide the desired deterrent effect. When used indiscriminately, however, house 
demolitions  lead  to  the  radicalization  of  the  population  and  backfire,  resulting  in  more 
subsequent attacks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the institutional details 
of house demolitions. Section 3 surveys related literature on counterterrorism policies. Section 4 
describes the data and summary statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis, and the last 
section concludes.   3 
 
2. House Demolitions: Background
2 
The  Israel  Defense  Forces  carries  out  two  main  types  of  house  demolitions:  house 
demolitions in “clearing operations” and punitive house demolitions.
3 
According  to  official  IDF  statements,  house  demolitions  in  clearing  operations  are 
intended to meet military needs. In particular, such house demolitions are intended to prevent the 
launching of attacks from these houses and areas. These demolitions are not related in any way 
to activities carried out by the owners or occupants of the houses being demolished. During the 
period 2000–2005, clearing operations took place primarily in the Gaza Strip to create “no go 
areas.” Houses were demolished mostly along the Egyptian border in the south; around Israeli 
settlements, army posts, and roads that were used by settlers and IDF forces throughout Gaza 
before the Israeli evacuation of 2005; and in the northern Gaza Strip, in areas from which mortar 
rockets (mainly Kassam) have been fired, targeting Israeli communities in southern Israel. We 
refer  to  such  demolitions  here  as  “precautionary  house  demolitions.”  We  have  data  on 
precautionary house demolitions for the years 2004 and 2005. 
The  second  type  of  demolition  is  “punitive  house  demolitions.”  In  punitive  house 
demolitions, the IDF demolishes or seals houses that were home to Palestinians suspected of, 
detained  in  connection  with,  or  convicted  of  involvement  in  violent  acts  against  Israelis, 
regardless of the results. These acts include suicide bombings that caused many civilian fatalities 
as well as thwarted attacks against soldiers or civilians. The demolished houses belong not only 
to perpetrators but to individuals accused of involvement in an attack, either by planning it, 
dispatching the perpetrators, or providing assistance to the responsible terrorist cell. We have 
data on all punitive house demolitions between the years 2000 and 2005. 
 
2.1. The Evolution of House Demolitions: From 1945 to the Second Intifada 
The policy of house demolitions in the region began during the British Mandate. In 1945 
the acting British high commissioner for Palestine enacted emergency defense regulations that 
                                                 
2 This section draws mostly on Darcy (2003) and Shnayderman (2004). 
3 A third type of demolition is administrative house demolitions of houses built without a building permit. 
These demolitions occur almost exclusively in East Jerusalem and are not related to security concerns. 
We do not include administrative house demolitions in our analysis because they are not security related, 
there is not geographic variation of these demolitions, and there are no good micro-level data on them.   4 
granted authorities the power to conduct searches, make arrests, establish military courts to try 
civilians  without  right  of  appeal,  close  off  areas,  deport  individuals,  impose  curfews,  and 
demolish  houses.  In  particular,  regulation  119(1)  allowed  the  military  to  seize  and  destroy 
houses, structures, and land as punishment for illegal acts. 
The Israeli security forces began conducting punitive house demolitions in 1967, right 
after the Six Days’ War, and demolished almost 1,400 houses in the late 1960s. Although the 
policy remained in place, punitive house demolitions were rare from the early 1970s until 1987. 
With the beginning of the first Intifada in December 1987, the IDF significantly increased the 
use of punitive house demolitions to punish and deter further acts of violence, resulting in almost 
500 demolitions in the years 1988–1992. There were only a few house demolitions between 1993 
and 1997, and the policy was discontinued from 1998 until September 2001. 
In response to the wave of violence of the second Intifada that began in October 2000, the 
IDF  informally  renewed  punitive  house  demolitions.  The  first  house  demolished  during  the 
second Intifada belonged to a Palestinian suicide bomber who killed 21 Israelis when he blew 
himself up in a discotheque in Tel Aviv.
4 The political-security cabinet of the Israeli government 
officially renewed the policy of punitive demolitions on July 31, 2002, right after a terror attack 
at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem killed nine Israelis. 
The use of house demolitions as a counterterrorism tool has been hotly debated inside and 
outside of Israel. Several human rights organizations have repeatedly challenged its legality. In 
cases argued before the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice, these organizations have asserted that 
the policy of house demolitions constitutes a war crime because it punishes innocent individuals 
for acts committed by others (Darcy, 2003).
5 
In  defense  of  this  policy,  Israeli  officials  repeatedly  argue  that  the  policy  of  house 
demolitions falls within the exception to article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention. According 
to  the  IDF,  the  demolition  of  houses  of  terrorists  and  terror  operatives  is  a  crucial 
counterterrorism tool for deterring terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular. The 
                                                 
4 This is the house of Sa’id al-Hutri, which was demolished on October 23, 2001, in Qalqiliya. 
5 These arguments are supported by article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which states that occupying states are forbidden to destroy property 
except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.   5 
Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly declined to interfere with the IDF’s operational military 
considerations (Nabot, 2003). 
 
3. The Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Policies: Related Literature 
Although the policy of house demolition has been vigorously debated in political and 
legal arenas, there are no systematic studies ascertaining whether house demolitions are effective 
in stopping terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular (Harel and Isacharoff, 2004). 
The Israeli government and the IDF have repeatedly argued before the Supreme Court of Justice 
and  in  the  popular  press  that  the  policy  is  effective,  although  they  acknowledge  that  “it i s  
impossible  to  know  the  exact  figures  of  potential  terrorists  that  have  been  deterred  from 
perpetrating  attacks  by  this  prevention  tactic.”
6  In  support  of  the  deterrent  effect  of  house 
demolitions, government and military officials often cite anecdotal evidence in which relatives of 
individuals recruited to commit suicide attacks have contacted the IDF and cooperated with the 
military in an attempt to stop the attack and thus save their houses from being demolished (Alon, 
2002). 
Opponents argue that demolishing houses backfires, since it increases the Palestinians’ 
hatred of and animosity toward Israel. For example, Shalev’s report of 1991 relies on seven data 
points from the first Intifada to argue that, in the aftermath of house demolitions, the number of 
violent events against Israelis did not decrease and sometimes even increased. 
Evaluating the effectiveness of house demolitions in particular, and counterterrorism in 
general, is a challenging empirical task. It is difficult to obtain micro-level data since security 
forces  are  reluctant  to  release  classified  counterterrorism  information.  Even  when  data  are 
available, the effect of counterterrorism policies remains unclear because terror organizations 
react to the new conditions by choosing different targets and modes of attack.
7 
 
                                                 
6 Cited from “IDF Spokesperson’s response to the House Demolition Report,” in Shnayderman (2004, 
64). 
7 There is a growing literature showing that terror groups strategically adapt to counterterror policies. See, 
among others, Baliga and Sjöström (2010), Berman (2009), Berman and Laitin (2008), and Enders and 
Sandler (1993, 2004). The related theoretical literature on counterterrorism takes terror groups’ strategic 
reaction  into  account  for  the  design  of  efficient  counterterror  policies  (see,  e.g.,  Bueno  de  Mesquita 
(2007) and Powell (2007a, 2007b)). 
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4. Data 
We use a novel data set on houses demolished between the years 2000 and 2005 as well 
as data containing the universe of Palestinians suicide terrorists during the same time period. We 
augment these data with information on other counterterrorism measures, as well as economic 
and demographic characteristics of Palestinian localities. 
Our data on house demolitions were obtained from B’Tselem, a nongovernmental Israeli 
human  rights  organization  that  monitors  and  collects  data  on  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict. 
Although several studies have used B’Tselem’s data on Israeli and Palestinian fatalities, ours is 
the first to use B’Tselem’s detailed micro-data on house demolitions.
8 
The data include all punitive house demolitions between September 2000 and December 
2005 and all precautionary house demolitions for the years 2004 and 2005. For every house 
demolition  (both  punitive  and  precautionary)  we  know  the  date  and  location  of  the  house 
demolished, as well as the number of units in each house, the number of residents in the house, 
and the house’s size. 
Table 1 depicts the yearly variation of house demolitions during the second Intifada. 
Punitive house demolitions vary significantly over time during this period. The IDF renewed the 
policy  of  punitive  house  demolitions  in  October  2001,  so  there  were  no  punitive  house 
demolitions in 2000 and just six punitive house demolitions in 2001. The number of houses 
demolished increases sharply to 235 houses in 2002, the most violent year of the second Intifada. 
Whereas the high number of punitive house demolitions remains almost unchanged in 2003, 
there is a monotonic decline in the number of punitive house demolitions in the final two years 
of the second Intifada. 
For each house, we list the number of apartment units, the number of residents, and the 
size of the house. Not surprisingly, these related measures of the severity of punitive house 
demolitions  are  highly  correlated  and  show  almost  the  same  fluctuation  over  time.  The 
correlation  between  house  demolitions  and  apartment  units  demolished  is  0.99,  and  the 
correlations between house demolitions and the number of residents in the demolished housed 
and the size of the houses demolished are 0.72 and 0.88, respectively. 
                                                 
8 For studies that use B’tselem’s data on Israeli and Palestinian fatalities see, among many others, Becker 
and Rubinstein (2008), Benmelech et al. (2010), Gould and Klor (2010), Gould and Stecklov (2009), and 
Jaeger and Paserman (2006 and 2008).   7 
Table 1 also presents the number of precautionary house demolitions in 2004 and 2005. 
The table shows a high number of precautionary demolitions in 2004 and a large decline in 2005. 
Most of these demolitions occurred in the Gaza Strip (only 25 of the 1,172 occurred in the West 
Bank). The large number of demolitions in the Gaza Strip is primarily the result of the IDF’s 
attempt to stop the smuggling of weapons and explosives from Egypt to Gaza through tunnels. In 
creating a 300-meter buffer zone along the border between Gaza and Egypt, the Israeli army 
demolished 619 houses in the southern district of Rafah between March and November 2004 
(Human Rights Watch, 2004).  
In the bottom panel of Table 1 we present data on suicide terrorists, Israeli fatalities, and 
Palestinian fatalities. The data on Palestinian suicide terrorists were constructed by Benmelech 
and Berrebi (2007) from reports of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and detail the biographies 
of all Palestinian suicide terrorists who attacked (or attempted to attack) targets in Israel, the 
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip between September 2000 and December 2005. The data contain 
information on terrorists’ characteristics, targets’ characteristics, and outcome of the attacks. In 
particular, for the 150 suicide terrorists in our data set we know their place of residence and the 
date of the attack. 
As expected, the number of punitive demolitions is highly correlated with the number of 
suicide terrorists. That is, we observe a yearly increase in the number of suicide terrorists up until 
2002 and a monotonic decrease after that peak for all subsequent years. We observe similar 
patterns of the evolution of violence when we focus on the fluctuations of Israeli and Palestinian 
fatalities over time. 
The  spatial  heterogeneity  of  suicide  terrorists  and  punitive  house  demolitions i s  
illustrated  in  Figure  1.  Listed  in  parentheses  are  both  the  number  of  suicide  terrorists  who 
originated from (first number) and the number of punitive house demolitions carried out in each 
of the ten districts in the West Bank, the five districts in the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem 
(second number). 
There  is  a  high  geographic  variation  with  respect  to  the  district  of  origin  of  suicide 
terrorists and of corresponding house demolitions, especially in the West Bank. Some districts 
are violent (Jenin, Nablus, Bethlehem, and Hebron), with a high number of suicide terrorists and 
punitive house demolitions, while other districts are fairly calm (Tubas, Jericho, and Salfit).   8 
Districts in the Gaza Strip are more homogenous than those in the West Bank in terms of the 
number of both suicide terrorists and punitive house demolitions. 
Table 2 refines the geographical description of Figure 1 by reporting summary statistics 
on the number of suicide terrorists originating from a locality, the number of Israeli-induced 
Palestinian fatalities, and the number of house demolitions for each locality in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.
9 
Violence varied substantially across localities. The average number of suicide terrorists 
originating from a locality is 0.218. Forty-three of the 683 localities had at least one suicide 
terrorist, and the maximum number of suicide terrorists originating from a locality (Nablus) is 
30. The average number of Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities is 4.9, and the maximum is 490 
(Ashati Refugee camp in the Gaza district). There are 0.9 punitive house demolitions in the 
average locality affecting 5.96 residents. 
Table 3 restricts the sample to the 43 localities from which at least one suicide terrorist 
originated. The average number of suicide terrorists per locality in this subsample is 3.5, and the 
median is 2. There were on average 63.5 Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities in these localities. 
The  average  number  of  punitive  house  demolitions  is  10.63,  and  the  average  number  of 
precautionary  house  demolitions  is  25.58.  Likewise,  about  70  local  residents  were  directly 
affected by punitive demolitions within a locality, and on average 239.5 residents were directly 
affected by precautionary demolitions during the period at issue. 
In  our  empirical  estimation  we  augment  the  data  on  suicide  bombers  and  house 
demolitions with economic and demographic variables from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey 
(PLFS) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
10 Table 4 displays summary statistics of the economic 
and  demographic  variables  of  interest  for  all  districts  and  provides  a  general  overview  of 
Palestinian  economic  and  demographic  conditions  during  second  Intifada.  We  observe  a 
                                                 
9 We classify localities using the 1997 Palestinian Census. Accordingly, there are 683 localities in East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. 
10  This  survey,  administered  by  the  Palestinian  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics  (PCBS),  covers  a 
representative sample of the Palestinian population. The survey has been conducted every quarter since 
1995 and provides information on a sample of about 22,000 individuals aged 15 and above residing in 
East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Since our empirical analysis focuses on the second 
Intifada, we use data from all quarterly surveys between the years 2000 and 2005, with a total of more 
than 500,000 individual-quarter observations. We use these micro-level data to calculate economic and 
demographic variables at the district level.   9 
relatively young population with low average years of schooling and a low unemployment rate 
due largely to extremely low labor force participation.  
In the bottom row of Table 4 we report summary statistics on the number of curfews days 
per district per quarter. The data on curfews was obtained from the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
11 OCHA provided data on total hours under 
curfew  by  district  by  month  between  May  2002  and  December  2005.  Over  this  period,  the 
average number of curfew days in a month within a district was 1.341, and the maximum was 4.6 
days (in Hebron).  
 
5. The Effect of House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks 
5.1 Empirical Framework 
To test the relationship between house demolitions and the number of suicide terrorists 
we focus on district-month cells (or localities-month cells). Our baseline regressions identify the 
effect  of  house  demolitions  within  a  district  on  future  suicide  attacks  originating  from  that 
district. Given that the number of attacks originated from a district at a particular month is a non-
negative integer, we estimate Poisson regression models. 
Formally, we estimate different variants of the following baseline specification:  
E [suicide terroristsi,t | xi,t–1] = exp (HDi,t–1β1 + xi,t–1β2 + λi + γt)       (1) 
where suicide terroristsi,t is the number of suicide terrorists that originate from district i in month 
t;  HDi,t–1  is  the  number  of  punitive  house  demolitions  in  district  i  in  month  t–1;  and  xi,t–1 
represents the other explanatory variables in the model that are used to control for potentially 
confounding  factors.  These  include  Israeli-induced  Palestinian  fatalities,  demographic  and 
economic characteristics, and Israeli security measures that vary across districts and time, all of 
which are listed in Table 4. λi is a district fixed effect that controls for districts’ unobservable 
characteristics that are time-invariant; γt is a year fixed effect that absorbs common fluctuations 
of violence over time. Hence, by including fixed effects for each district and year, we essentially 
examine whether variation over time in punitive house demolitions within a district is correlated 
with  variation  over  time  within  a  district  of  suicide  terror  attacks,  while  controlling  for  the 
                                                 
11 OCHA coordinates humanitarian action on behalf of the United Nations in many countries. As one of 
its responsibilities, the OCHA office in the West Bank and Gaza Strip monitors closures and curfews 
imposed on the Palestinian population.   10 
common trend in violence across districts and a rich set of districts’ characteristics. In some of 
the specifications in the tables below we include district-specific time trends, thus showing that 
the  results  are  robust  to  an  alternative  identifying  assumption.  Last,  in  all  specifications  we 
cluster the error term at the district level to capture nonsystematic determinants of the number of 
suicide terrorists. 
 
5.2 Main Results 
We present the results from estimating the impact of punitive house demolitions on the 
number of suicide terrorists from the same district in subsequent months in Table 5. We estimate 
a panel Poisson model controlling—depending on the specification—for district fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, and districts’ economic and demographic 
characteristics  (unemployment,  percentage  employed  in  Israel,  average  years  of  schooling, 
average age, and fraction of males and married individuals in the district’s population). In some 
specifications  we  also  control  for  other  security-related  measures  (in  addition  to  house 
demolitions) for which data are available: (1) the number of Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities, 
and (2) the number of days with a curfew.
12 
The  effect  of  punitive  house  demolitions  on  the  number  of  suicide  terrorists  is  not 
statistically significant when we only control separately for either district or year fixed effects 
(Columns  1–3).  In  fact,  without  controlling  for  district  fixed  effects,  we  observe  a  positive 
correlation between punitive house demolitions and number of suicide terrorists. This result is 
likely to be caused by an omitted variable bias, since more violent districts obviously have more 
punitive  house  demolitions  and  a  higher  number  of  suicide  terrorists.  Nonetheless,  a  naive 
interpretation of this positive correlation is sometimes being used in public discourse as proof 
that house demolitions backfire. 
When  we  control  for  district  fixed  effects  (to  account  for  unobserved  underlying 
heterogeneity across districts) and year fixed effects (to account for common fluctuations over 
time of the variables of interest), we see that punitive house demolitions in a given district 
significantly decrease the number of suicide terrorists who originate from that district. This effect 
                                                 
12 The inclusion of days with a curfew into the model considerably lowers the number of observations 
from 1,008 district-month observations to 704 because this variable is available only from May 2002 
onward.   11 
is not only statistically significant but of an important magnitude. In particular, the estimated rate 
ratio implies that the marginal punitive house demolition lowers the number of suicide terrorists 
originating from a district in the following month by a factor of 0.941. This effect implies that a 
standard deviation increase in the number of punitive house demolitions (which is equal to 2.04) 
causes a decrease of 11.7 percent in the number of suicide terrorists originating from an average 
district-month cell.  
The negative effect of punitive house demolitions on the number of subsequent suicide 
terrorists is qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the inclusion of additional controls, such as 
demographic and economic characteristics (Column 5), as well as other proxies for the security 
situation  at  the  district  level ( Column  7).  Moreover,  when  we  include  district-specific  time 
trends, the result (Column 6) is also robust to different identifying assumptions that are based on 
deviations  of  house  demolitions  and  the  number  of  suicide  terrorists  from  districts’  specific 
trends (and not only the districts’ averages, as in the other columns). 
In Table 6 we repeat the same specifications of Columns 4 to 7 in Table 5 but focus on 
the other available measures for the severity of house demolitions. The results confirm that the 
main conclusions from Table 5 are robust to different measures of house demolitions and across 
different specifications. That is, punitive house demolitions have a significant deterrent effect on 
suicide terrorism regardless of whether we focus on the number of apartment units, the number 
of residents, or the size of the houses being demolished. The point estimates for each measure are 
not  affected  by  the  additions  of  demographic  and  economic  controls  or  other  measures  of 
counterterrorism. The estimates are also robust to the inclusion of district-specific time trends.  
We analyze the data using both district-month and locality-month aggregations. Tables 7 
and 8 repeat the regressions in Tables 5 and 6, respectively, focusing on locality-month cells 
instead of district-month cells. That is, Tables 7 and 8 are based on more refined micro-level 
data. The data set that focuses on localities is more detailed and hence the estimation is more 
precise than when using district-level data. Once we introduce locality fixed effects, however, 
the estimates rely only on the 43 localities in which least one suicide terrorist originated (out of 
683 localities). Hence, by comparing the results from both district-month and locality-month 
aggregations, we make sure that the results are not unduly affected by the elimination from the 
sample of localities in which suicide attacks did not originate.   12 
We see a similar pattern in Tables 7 and 8 to the one found using data at the district level. 
That is, punitive house demolitions are shown to have a significant deterrent effect on suicide 
terrorists also when using data at the locality level. Remarkably, even the point estimates are of 
almost the same magnitude as those in Tables 5 and 6. While measured at the locality level, a 
one standard deviation increase in punitive house demolitions causes a decrease of 14.9 percent 
on  the  odds  of  that  a  suicide  terrorist  originated  from  that  locality  within  a  month  of  the 
demolitions. This effect is higher than the one observed when data is aggregated at the district 
level (11.7 percent). As we show in subsection 5.4 below, the difference is explained by the 
spatial dissipation of the deterrent effect of punitive house demolitions. 
In sum, we observe that punitive house demolitions have an immediate deterrent effect on 
suicide terrorism. This effect is robust to different specifications and for different measures of 
punitive house demolitions. In additional analysis presented in the Appendix we show that the 
effects of punitive house demolitions are qualitatively and quantitatively the same if we use a 
Negative Binomial model instead of a Poisson model (Table A.1). The deterrent effect of house 
demolitions on suicide terrorism is even larger when we eliminate from the sample the first year 
of the second Intifada, in which the IDF did not conduct punitive house demolitions (see Table 
A.2).  
 
5.3 Dynamic Effects of Punitive House Demolitions 
The previous section established that punitive house demolitions led to an immediate 
decline in suicide terrorism—within one month after the demolition. This section examines the 
persistency  of  the  deterrent  effect  of  house  demolitions.  We  study  the  persistency  of  house 
demolitions over six months using a series of six Poisson regressions. That is, for each of the 
four available measures for house demolitions we use the specification in Column 5 of Table 5, 
except that each regression uses a different lag of house demolitions, which varies from one to 
six months. Figure 2 presents the estimated coefficients as well as 90 percent confidence bands. 
The  figure  shows  that  the  effect  of  punitive  house  demolitions,  though  significant  a 
month  after  their  occurrence,  fades  away  over t i m e .  That  is,  the  pattern  of  coefficients 
consistently shows for the four measures a negative and significant effect of house demolitions 
within a one-month lag and an almost monotonic convergence to zero for higher-order lags. Note 
also that the effect of punitive house demolitions is not statistically different from zero from a lag   13 
of two months and onward, indicating that the deterrent effect of house demolitions basically 
disappears after one month of their occurrence.
13 
One concern that arises from the findings in Figure 2 is that the short-lived effect of 
house demolitions is in fact caused by other counterterrorism measures that the IDF imposes on 
the terrorists’ localities of origin after suicide attacks. For example, after a suicide attack the IDF 
may  choose  not  only  to  demolish  the  house  of  the  perpetrator  but  also  to  impose  curfews, 
closures, and roadblocks while also increasing military presence in the area. Although we are 
able to control for curfews and Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities, we do not have information 
on all other possible counterterrorism measures. 
The analysis in Table 9 directly addresses the concern that confounding factors prevalent 
in the aftermath of a terror attack are behind the observed impact of punitive house demolitions 
on suicide terrorism. In this analysis, we eliminate from the data set all locality-month cells in 
which the IDF demolishes a house within a month of a suicide attack in direct retaliation for the 
attack.
14 
The results of this analysis show that the significant negative effect of house demolitions 
on the number of suicide terrorists is not caused exclusively by immediate house demolitions 
after a terror attack. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant and only slightly lower 
in magnitude when compared to the coefficients estimated using the universe of suicide terrorists 
(Tables 7 and 8). 
An alternative concern is that strategic considerations of terror cells may cause a decrease 
in suicide terrorism after a suicide attack. For example, the dynamics of suicide terrorism may be 
such that a terror cell imposes a period of relative calm, a strategy of “laying low,” after a 
successful terror attack. Table 10 adds to the regressions the number of contemporaneous suicide 
attacks as an additional control variable to address this issue directly.  
The results show that recent suicide terror attacks do not systematically affect future 
attacks.  The  coefficients  on  contemporaneous  suicide  attacks  are  not  consistently  significant 
across different specifications, and they even change sign when we control for other measures of 
                                                 
13 This is consistent with the results of Jaeger et al. (2008). They found that Israeli-induced Palestinian 
fatalities radicalize the preferences of the Palestinian population within one month of their occurrence but 
that the effect dissipates within three months. 
14  This  occurred  after  20 s u i c i d e  a t t a c k s ,  with  17  cases  in  which t h e  s u i c i d e  t e r r o r i s t ’ s  h o u s e  w a s  
demolished within four days of the attack.   14 
counterterrorism.  Importantly,  however,  the  coefficients  on  house  demolitions  remain  highly 
statistically significant and of the same magnitude as those estimated in Tables 5 and 6. Hence, 
the message that emerges from Tables 9 and 10 and Figure 2 is that punitive house demolitions 
have a significant, albeit short-lived, negative impact on the number of suicide terrorists. 
 
5.4 Geographic Effects of Punitive House Demolitions 
In  this  section  we  analyze  the  geographic  dispersion  of  the  effect  of  punitive  house 
demolitions  on  suicide  terrorism.  To  that  end,  we  study  whether  house  demolitions  in  a 
neighboring  district  have  an  effect  on  local  suicide  terrorism.  That  is,  we  add  to  the 
specifications in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 an additional covariate with the number of punitive 
house demolitions in the rest of the districts in the same region.
15 
We find that the effects of house demolitions dissipate not only over time but also across 
geographic distance (Table 11). Accordingly, the effects of local punitive house demolitions on 
the number of local suicide terrorists are still negative and statistically significant. However, 
punitive house demolitions in other districts in the same region do not have a significant impact 
on the number of suicide terrorists. 
 
5.5 The Effects of Precautionary House Demolitions 
Here we study the effects of precautionary house demolitions on suicide terrorism. As 
mentioned in section 2, precautionary house demolitions refer to houses demolished in “clearing 
operations” intended to meet military needs. For houses demolished for punitive reasons, the IDF 
directly links the owner and/or occupant of the house to terror activity against Israel. That is, 
there is a direct link between an individual’s action and the resulting punishment. In contrast, for 
houses demolished for precautionary reasons, the IDF does not claim an existing connection 
between  the  house  occupant  and  terror  activity.  Hence,  there  is  no  connection  between  the 
individual’s actions and the resulting demolition of the house. In fact, the main determinant of 
precautionary house demolitions is whether the house is located near the Egyptian or Israeli 
borders  or  surrounding  an  Israeli  settlement  or  roads  used  by  settlers.  Following  Kalyvas’s 
                                                 
15 We use the standard division of the 16 districts under the Palestinian Authority into West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Accordingly, there are 11 districts in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and 5 districts 
in the Gaza Strip (see Figure 1).   15 
(2006) classification of types of violence, we view punitive house demolitions as a form of 
selective violence and precautionary house demolitions as a form of indiscriminate violence. 
We test the effectiveness of precautionary house demolitions in Table 12. The models 
estimated include, in addition to precautionary house demolitions, the same controls used in 
Column 7 in Table 5.
16 The table shows results with the data aggregated at the district and at the 
locality level. In addition, we present results both for the entire sample and excluding Rafah from 
the sample since Rafah is a clear outlier during this period.
17 
Interestingly, the results show that precautionary demolitions have a positive effect on the 
number  of  suicide  terrorists.  The  estimated  coefficients  are  statistically  significant  (when 
excluding  Rafah  from  the  sample)  and  of  an  important  magnitude.  The  estimated  rate  ratio 
implies  that  the  marginal  precautionary  house  demolition  increases  the  number  of  suicide 
terrorists originating from a district in the following month by a factor of 1.051. This effect 
implies that a standard deviation increase in the number of precautionary house demolitions 
(which is equal to 7.99) causes an increase of 48.7 percent on the number of suicide terrorists 
originating from an average district-month cell.  
These results provide strong support to the hypothesis that indiscriminate violence is 
counterproductive because it creates new grievances.
18 As argued by Rosendorff and Sandler 
(2004)  and  Bueno  de  Mesquita  and  Dickson  (2007)  in  related  studies  of  terrorism,  and  by 
Kalyvas (2006) in his comprehensive study on the use of violence in civil wars, indiscriminate 
violence against civilians increases popular support for terrorist and insurgent groups. Terrorists 
and insurgents usually translate this increase into bigger cadres and increased violence against 
their political opponents.
  
                                                 
16 Given that the data on precautionary house demolitions are available only for the years 2004 and 2005, 
we  do  not  have  enough  within-district  or  within-locality  variation f o r  t h i s  t y p e  o f  d e m o l i t i o n . 
Consequently, the regressions do not converge when we include district- or locality-specific linear time 
trends. 
17 See related discussion in section 3. 
18 See Condra and Shapiro (2010) for additional empirical support to this result based on an analysis of 
violence  in  Iraq  between  2004 a n d  2008.  Note,  however,  that  Lyall  (2009)  finds  that  the  use  of 
indiscriminate violence in Chechnya by the Russian army caused a significant decrease in insurgents’ 
attacks.   16 
 
6. Conclusions 
This  paper  presents  the  first  systematic  examination  of  the  effectiveness  of  house 
demolitions  using  a  novel  micro-level  data  set.  Our  analysis  shows  that  punitive  house 
demolitions, a selective policy of counterterrorism, lead to an immediate decrease in the number 
of suicide terrorists. This effect dissipates over time and space. In contrast to punitive house 
demolitions, precautionary house demolitions, which can be likened to an indiscriminate policy 
of counterterrorism, lead to a significance increase in the number of suicide terror attacks against 
Israeli citizens. 
While  we  find  that  punitive  house  demolitions  are  an  effective  tool  to  deter  suicide 
terrorism, it may not be an efficient policy because it may cause some undesirable consequences. 
For example, punitive house demolitions may lead to an increase in other types of terror attacks 
or bring about animosity from the international community against Israel. That said, by showing 
which types of demolitions deter terrorists and which promote more terrorism, we shed more 
light  on  the  desirability  of  house  demolitions  and  their  effectiveness  as  a  counter-suicide-
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Figure 1. Suicide terrorists and house demolitions, October 2000–December 2005 
   20 
Figure 2. The dynamic effects of punitive demolitions on the number of suicide attacks (95% CI 
in shaded area) 
 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Punitive  0 6 235 218 167 2
Precautionary - - - - 1,156 16
Punitive  0 7 246 218 174 2
Precautionary - - - - 1,404 17
Punitive  0 24 1,371 1,766 895 17
Precautionary - - - - 10,704 74
Punitive  0 1,010 26,313 32,219 23,868 400
Precautionary - - - - 216,278 1,972
3 32 59 28 15 13
41 191 421 185 108 50
280 462 1,000 580 825 190
Table 1
Suicide Terror Attacks, Palestinian Fatalities, and House Demolitions by Year
Notes: Entries reflect the total number of suicide terrorists, Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities, and house demolitions by year. The year 2000 covers only the months of October,





Number of Residents in Demolished Houses




0.218 1.57 0 30
4.886 29.97 0 490
Punitive  0.919 4.55 0 88
Precautionary 1.716 26.59 0 605
Punitive  0.944 4.59 0 86
Precautionary 2.081 32.14 0 756
Punitive  5.96 34.54 0 765
Precautionary 15.78 264.11 0 6,325
Punitive  122.71 565 0 9,755
Precautionary 319.55 4,969 0 117,156
Notes: Entries reflect the respective statistic for the total variable of interest for each locality between October 2000 and December
2005. The data on suicide terrorists come from Israeli Security Agency reports. The data for the rest of the variables come from
Btselem. All the calculations are based on the extant 683 Palestinian localities surveyed in the 1997 Palestinian Census conducted by
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
Table 2
Summary Statistics on Localities number of Suicide Terrorists, Palestinian Fatalities, and House Demolitions
(using all 683 localities in the Palestinian Census of 1997)
Size of Houses Demolished (in square meters)





Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
3.47 5.329 2.0 1 30
63.5 103.44 14 0 490
Punitive 10.63 14.55 6 0 88
Precautionary  25.58 103.82 0 0 605
Punitive 11.00 14.52 6 0 88
Precautionary  31.09 125.52 0 0 756
Punitive 69.93 118.9 36 0 765
Precautionary  239.53 1,037 0 0 6,325
Punitive 1,360 1,744 750 0 9,755
Precautionary  4,757 19,401 0 0 117,156
Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
Size of Houses Demolished (in square meters)
Table 3
Summary Statistics on Localities' Number of Suicide Terrorists, Palestinian Fatalities, and House Demolitions
(using only the 43 localities in which a suicide terrorist originated)
Notes: Entries reflect the respective statistic for the total variable of interest for each locality between October 2000 and December 2005. The data on
suicide terrorists come from Israeli Security Agency reports. The data for the rest of the variables come from B'tselem. 





Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
33.6 0.840 33.9 32.2 34.7
0.502 0.008 0.501 0.478 0.512
0.569 0.023 0.561 0.532 0.609
9.18 0.398 9.20 8.26 9.83
0.106 0.024 0.113 0.056 0.153
0.045 0.029 0.044 0.013 0.118
1.341 1.712 0.057 0 4.596
Table 4
Summary Statistics on Curfews, Economic, and Demographic Characteristics
Years of Schooling
Share of Population Working in Israel
Notes: Entries reflect the respective statistic for the districts' averages between October 2000 and December 2005 for all variables except curfews
(available only from May 2002 onward). The data on curfews come from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The data for the rest of





Share of Males in PopulationVariable
0.0633 * 0.0281 -0.0186 -0.0607 *** -0.0609 *** -0.0527 *** -0.0492 **
Districts' Economic and Demographic Characteristics
- Unemployment -2.0040 -8.4461 * -8.0973
- Percentage Employed in Israel 1.5980 0.8483 -11.655
- Years of Schooling -0.2781 0.2201 -0.2468
- Age 0.2900 * 0.5115 *** 0.0323
- Married -0.3319 -2.5222 1.7027
- Male 11.070 8.744 -7.4672
- Palestinian Fatalities 0.010 * -0.0425
- Days with Curfews 0.0603 **
Table 5
The Effect of Punitive House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks





Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic and demographic characteristics data
from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Notes: Estimated via panel Poisson regression model. Dependent variable is the number of suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; ***
indicates statistically significant at 1% level.














































-0.0632 *** -0.0640 *** -0.0586 *** -0.0539 ***
-0.0131 *** -0.0135 *** -0.0130 *** -0.0115 ***
-0.0463 *** -0.0467 *** -0.0445 *** -0.0410 **
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel Poisson regression model.
Dependent variable is the suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. The economic and demographic controls are the
same ones used in specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5. Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian
fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district
level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level.
District-Specific Linear Time Trends No No Yes No
1,008 704 Number of Observations  1,008
Table 6
The Effect Punitive House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks
(all data aggregated at the district level)
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic
and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set
covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Number of Apartment Units Demolished





























-0.0136 -0.0505 -0.0213 -0.0608 *** -0.0609 *** -0.0550 ** -0.0560 **
Districts' Economic and Demographic Characteristics
- Unemployment -1.9330 -8.1658 * -8.4613
- Percentage Employed in Israel 1.6018 0.556 -11.610
- Years of Schooling -0.2519 0.1971 -0.1298
- Age 0.2953 * 0.5459 *** 0.0216
- Married -0.1299 -1.9841 2.1108
- Male 11.116 8.3061 -7.9122
- Palestinian Fatalities 0.0077 -0.0361
- Days with Curfews 0.0592 **
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic and demographic characteristics data
from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Notes: Estimated via panel Poisson regression model. Dependent variable is the number of suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; ***
indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
No No No Yes No
Table 7
















Number of Observations 42,346 42,346 2,666 2,666 2,666 1,849
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes
District-Specific Linear Time Trends No No
No Yes Yes Yes Yes










(3) (4) (5) (7)
[3.598]
Punitive House Demolitions
[0.0438] [0.0396] [0.0294] [0.0239]
(1) (2)Variable
-0.0632 *** -0.0640 *** -0.0585 *** -0.0604 **
-0.0132 *** -0.0135 *** -0.0129 *** -0.0126 ***
-0.0464 *** -0.0467 ** -0.0445 ** -0.0465 *
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic
and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from OCHA. The data set covers
the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel Poisson regression model.
Dependent variable is the suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. The economic and demographic controls are the
same ones used in specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5. Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian
fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district
level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level.
Table 8
The Effect of Punitive House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks
Other Proxies for Counter-terrorism No No Yes
Number of Observations  2,666 2,666 1,849
Yes
2,666
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes




Locality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
[0.0217]
Yes
 Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
[0.0039] [0.0042] [0.0047]
 Size of House Demolished (hundred square meters)
[0.0042]
Number of Apartment Units Demolished
[0.0238] [0.0254] [0.0292] [0.0247]
(1) (2) (4) (3)
District-Specific Linear Time Trends No No Yes NoVariable
-0.0563 ** -0.0573 ** -0.0495 * -0.0528 *
-0.0593 ** -0.0609 ** -0.0529 ** -0.0574 *
-0.0122 *** -0.0126 *** -0.0115 *** -0.0115 ***
-0.0460 ** -0.0468 ** -0.0430 * -0.0471 *
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic
and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set
covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel Poisson regression model.
Dependent variable is the suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. The economic and demographic controls are the
same ones used in specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5. Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian
fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district
level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level.
(excluding localities-month cells with suicide attacks and house demolitions)
District Specific Linear Time Trends No No Yes No
Other Proxies for Counter-terrorism No No No Yes
Number of Observations  2,646 2,646 2,646 1,830
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic and Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
 Size of House Demolished (hundred square meters)
[0.0203] [0.0219] [0.0224] [0.0272]
Locality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.0252] [0.0274] [0.0263] [0.0326]
 Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
[0.0040] [0.0043] [0.0044] [0.0047]
Number of Houses Demolished
[0.0248] [0.0269] [0.0262] [0.0317]
Number of Apartment Units Demolished
Table 9
The Effect of Punitive House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks
(1) (2) (3) (4)Variable
-0.0582 *** -0.0603 *** -0.0525 *** -0.0493 **
0.1494 0.1393 * 0.0691 -0.0215
-0.0607 *** -0.0634 *** -0.0585 *** -0.0540 ***
0.1493 0.1396 * 0.0591 -0.0210
-0.0127 *** -0.0135 *** -0.0130 *** -0.0115 ***
0.1467 0.1391 * 0.0590 -0.0235
-0.0443 *** -0.0462 *** -0.0444 *** -0.0410 **
0.1516 0.1409 * 0.0596 -0.0146 Contemporaneous Suicide Attacks
[0.0933] [0.0846] [0.0754] [0.1271]
Contemporaneous Suicide Attacks
[0.0940] [0.0835] [0.0727] [0.1264]
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel Poisson regression model.
Dependent variable is the suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. The economic and demographic controls are the
same ones used in specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5. Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian
fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district
level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level.
Contemporaneous Suicide Attacks
[0.0917] [0.0826] [0.0645] [0.1300]
Contemporaneous Suicide Attacks
[0.0925] [0.0830] [0.0732]
Number of Observations  2,646 2,646 2,646 1,830
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic
and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set
covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Other Proxies for Counter-terrorism No No No Yes
District-Specific Linear Time Trends No No Yes No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic and Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
 Size of House Demolished (hundred square meters)
[0.0153] [0.0169] [0.0177] [0.0202]
Locality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.0163] [0.0189] [0.0175] [0.0204]
 Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
[0.0037] [0.0041] [0.0042] [0.0042]
[0.1326]
Number of Houses Demolished
[0.0173] [0.0199] [0.0186] [0.0228]
Number of Apartment Units Demolished
Table 10
The Effect of Punitive House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks, Controlling for Terror Dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4)Variable
- Demolitions in the District -0.0413 ** -0.0494 * -0.0435 *** -0.0539 **
- Other Demolitions in the Region -0.0177 0.0009 -0.0174 0.00005
- Demolitions in the District -0.0103 *** -0.0109 ** -0.0381 * -0.0417 *
- Other Demolitions in the Region -0.0026 -0.0007 -0.00979 0.00448
District Specific Linear Time Trends Yes No Yes No
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA,
economic and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA.
The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel poisson regression
model. Dependent variable is the suicide terror attacks originating in locality i at month t. The economic and demographic
controls are the same ones used in specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5. Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-
induced Palestinian fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5. Robust standard errors, adjusted for
clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically
significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
Number of Observations  1,008 704
[0.0165] [0.0194]
[0.0026]
Economic and Demographic Controls Yes
Other Proxies for Counter-terrorism
[0.0149]
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes























 Number of Apartment Units 
Demolished
Number of Houses Demolished
Number of Residents in 
Demolished Houses
Size of Houses Demolished 
(hundred square meters)
Table 11
The Geographic Effect of Punitive Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks
(1) (2) (4)
[0.0247]Variable
0.0193 0.0497 *** 0.0077 0.0239 **
0.0103 0.0413 *** 0.0025 0.0184
0.0018 0.0038 *** 0.0008 0.0017
0.0066 0.0344 *** 0.0016 0.0140 *
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic
and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set covers
the period March 2004 to December 2005.
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel Poisson regression model.
Dependent variable in panel A is the number of suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. Dependent variable in panel B
is the number of suicide terror attacks originating in locality i at month t. All specifications control for economic and demographic
conditions, other proxies for counterterrorism, district fixed effects and years fixed effects as in specification 7 in Table 5. Robust
standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates
statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
Number of Observations  384 360 989 966
[0.0103] [0.0072] [0.0118]
[0.0167]
 Size of House Demolished (hundred square meters)
[0.0058] [0.0113] [0.0042] [0.0075]
 Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0014]




Number of Apartment Units Demolished
Entire Sample Excluding Rafah Entire Sample Excluding Rafah
Table 12
The Effect Precautionary House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks
Data Aggregated at District Level Terror Data at Locality LevelVariable
-0.0559 *** -0.0579 *** -0.0493 *** -0.0586 * -0.0633 *** -0.0649 ** -0.0573 ** -0.0621 *
-0.0593 ** -0.0614 *** -0.0545 *** -0.0629 ** -0.0662 ** -0.0681 *** -0.0608 ** -0.0664 *
-0.0121 *** -0.0126 *** -0.0121 *** -0.0126 *** -0.0136 *** -0.0141 *** -0.0133 *** -0.0136 ***
-0.0417 *** -0.0453 *** -0.0414 ** -0.0486 * -0.0483 ** -0.0504 ** -0.0468 ** -0.0524 *
[0.0270] [0.0340]
All data aggregated at the district level Using data at the locality level
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force
Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel Negative Binomial regression model. Dependent variable is the suicide terror attacks originating in
district i at month t. The economic and demographic controls are the same ones used in specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5. Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities and
curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically
significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
2,666 2,666 2,666 1,849
No No Yes No
(5) (6) (7) (8)
[0.0268] [0.0282]
No Yes Yes Yes
No No No Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.0342]
[0.0044] [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0053]
[0.0217] [0.0233] [0.0238] [0.0303]
Number of Observations  1,008 1,008 1,008 704
Other Proxies for Counter-terrorism No No
District Specific Linear Time Trends No No Yes No
Table A.1
The Effect of Punitive House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks using a Negative Binomial Model
[0.0269] [0.0285] [0.0269]
Economic and Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
No Yes
Locality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.0047] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0051]
 Size of House Demolished (hundred square meters)
[0.0174] [0.0193] [0.0192] [0.0274]
Number of Apartment Units Demolished
[0.0205] [0.0218] [0.0190] [0.0291]
 Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Houses Demolished
[0.0212] [0.0228] [0.0201] [0.0320]Variable
-0.0701 *** -0.0714 *** -0.0554 *** -0.0492 ** -0.0702 *** -0.0714 *** -0.0577 ** -0.0560 **
-0.0725 ** -0.0745 *** -0.0618 *** -0.0539 *** -0.0725 ** -0.0745 *** -0.0616 ** -0.0604 **
-0.0149 *** -0.0158 *** -0.0138 *** -0.0115 *** -0.0149 *** -0.0158 *** -0.0138 *** -0.0126 ***
-0.0539 *** -0.0548 *** -0.0460 *** -0.0410 ** -0.0539 *** -0.0548 *** -0.0459 ** -0.0465 *
Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force
Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel Poisson regression model. Dependent variable is the suicide terror attacks originating in district i at
month t. The economic and demographic controls are the same ones used in specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5. Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities and curfews, as
used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant
at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
No
Number of Observations  832 832 832 704 2,193 2,193 2,193 1,849
No Yes
District-Specific Linear Time Trends No No Yes No No No Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Other Proxies for Counter-terrorism No No No Yes No No
Economic and Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes No
Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.0230] [0.0260]
Locality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0047]
 Size of House Demolished (hundred square meters)
[0.0152] [0.0188] [0.0194] [0.0204] [0.0206] [0.0221]
 Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
[0.0039] [0.0050] [0.0048] [0.0042] [0.0040]
[0.0284]
Number of Apartment Units Demolished
[0.0167] [0.0223] [0.0202] [0.0207] [0.0247] [0.0270] [0.0265] [0.0292]
(7) (8)
Number of Houses Demolished
[0.0174] [0.0230] [0.0208] [0.0230] [0.0245] [0.0267] [0.0264]
Table A.2
The Effect of Punitive House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks (from September 2001 to December 2005)
All data aggregated at the district level Using data at the locality level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)